

Moral Philosophy from the Perspective of Evolution and Evolutionary Psychology

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Summary

This article comprehensively examines the biological and evolutionary foundations of human morality within the framework of evolutionary psychology. It provides a holistic view of the nature of human morality by exploring in depth the evolutionary origins of moral emotions and behaviors, mechanisms of social cooperation, kin selection theory, and group selection. Research shows the existence of universal moral intuitions, and cultural differences are manifestations of these universal mechanisms in various ways. The article discusses the adaptive value of moral behavior from the perspective of evolutionary psychology, its neurobiological underpinnings, modern The functioning of our evolutionarily developed moral intuitions in societies and the contributions of evolutionary explanations to moral philosophy are examined.

1. Introduction

Throughout history, people have tried to define the concepts of right and wrong, moral values and norms. Philosophy, religion and culture have offered various answers to these questions. In the last 30 years, evolutionary psychology has added a new dimension to the debate by developing new insights into the biological basis of moral behavior and emotions.

Evolutionary psychology argues that the human mind is shaped by evolutionary processes psychological mechanisms evolved to solve adaptive problems faced by our ancestors. As evolutionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (1992) have argued, the human mind is not a blank slate, but rather has evolved over the course of our evolutionary history. is a product of adaptation, consisting of functional mechanisms designed to solve the recurrent problems we face. This perspective offers new insights into the understanding of human psychology, including moral emotions and behavior.

In this article, we will explore the origins of morality from the perspective of evolutionary psychology, providing a comprehensive overview of the evolutionary meaning of moral intuitions, mechanisms of social cooperation, theories of kin selection and group selection, and the common evolutionary foundations behind cross-cultural moral diversity. In addition, we will analyze how our evolutionarily developed moral intuitions work and how evolutionary explanations and explain their place in moral philosophy.

2. Evolutionary Foundations of Morality

2.1. Moral Intuitions and Feelings

Evolutionary psychologists argue that moral emotions and intuitions evolved in the process of adapting to the problems our ancestors faced in their social lives. According to this perspective, moral emotions such as shame, guilt, empathy, and a sense of justice evolved to promote cooperation within social groups and maintain social order (Haidt, 2012).

Jonathan Haidt's "Theory of Moral Foundations" proposes that universal moral intuitions are organized along six basic dimensions:

1. **Care/Harm:** Providing empathy and protection to vulnerable or suffering individuals impulse. This moral foundation is thought to have developed as a result of evolutionary pressures to protect children in particular. Neurobiologically, it is thought that hormones such as oxytocin and vasopressin regulation (Churchland, 2011).
2. **Fairness/Cheating:** The tendency to act fairly in cooperative relationships and to punish cheaters. Research has shown that humans and even some primates have strong tendencies to reject unfair offers and to impose penalties for cheating (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003). This tendency is mutual supports cooperation.
3. **Loyalty/Betrayal:** Commitment to group identity and the tendency to show loyalty to the group.
In evolutionary terms, the adaptive value of group loyalty is high, given that group membership is critical for survival and reproductive success. Research from social identity theory and the minimal group paradigm suggests that people easily develop group affiliation and show in-group favoritism.
documented (Tajfel and Turner, 1979).
4. **Authority/Destruction:** It is the tendency to recognize hierarchical social structures and respect legitimate authority. Primate studies have shown that in many primate species shows the importance of hierarchies. In humans, respect for legitimate authority facilitates social coordination and reduces in-group conflicts (Boehm, 2012).
5. **Holiness/Corruption:** The tendency to avoid pollution, especially physical and spiritual pollution, and to preserve purity of body and soul. This moral basis may derive from evolutionary adaptations to protect against disease and parasites (Schaller and Park, 2011). The sense of disgust functions as an important regulatory mechanism in this context.
6. **Freedom/oppression:** It is the tendency to resist constraint and oppression and to defend autonomy. This is a moral foundation that was later added to Haidt's theory and

is associated with the tendency to form coalitions against oppressive leaders, especially in hierarchical societies (Haidt, 2012).

Cross-cultural research shows that these moral foundations are common to different cultures, although the weights given to these foundations differ. For example, in Western liberal societies, the bases of care/harm and justice/deception are more prominent, whereas in more traditional societies, bases such as holiness and authority are more valued (Haidt and Graham, 2007).

2.2. Mutual Altruism and Cooperation

The theory of reciprocal altruism developed by Robert Trivers is an important concept in explaining why people help unrelated strangers. According to this theory, individuals make sacrifices in the expectation of future reciprocity. Reciprocal altruism underpins cooperation, which is critical for the survival of human groups.

Trivers stated that certain conditions are necessary for mutual altruism to evolve:

1. Repeated interactions: Individuals should interact with each other over time.
2. Recognition skills: Individuals should be able to recognize individuals with whom they have interacted before.
3. Detection of cheating: Individuals should be able to identify individuals who are uncooperative or cheating.
4. Memory: Individuals should be able to recall past interactions.

Evolutionary game theory models, in particular Robert Axelrod's tournament studies, have shown that simple strategies such as "tit-for-tat" are effective in promoting mutual altruism. This strategy involves cooperating in the first interaction and imitating the opponent's previous move in subsequent interactions.

Evolutionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby have proposed humans have cheat detection modules, specialized to detect cheating in social exchange situations. Experiments with the Wason choice task have shown that while humans struggle with abstract logical problems, they are much better at solving the same problems in a social contract format. This finding supports the idea that the human mind is specialized to detect cheating in the context of social exchange.

Reputation systems also play an important role in supporting collaboration. Reputation is a social assessment of an individual's trustworthiness on past behavior. Reputation is the indirect reciprocity of individuals even with those with whom they do not interact directly.

relationships. Alexander (1987) developed the concept of "indirect reciprocity" in humans and argued that it is critical in supporting cooperation in large social networks.

Neurobiological research has shown that cooperation and reciprocal altruism are regulated by neurotransmitters such as dopamine, oxytocin and serotonin.

Oxytocin in particular has been associated with trust and bonding behaviors (Zak, 2012).

fMRI (functional MRI) studies have shown that reward centers (ventral striatum such as the one shown in the) were activated, suggesting that cooperation is intrinsically rewarding.

2.3. Kin Selection and Group Selection

William Hamilton's (1964) theory of "kin selection" explains why individuals tend to help their genetic relatives. Hamilton's concept of "inclusive fitness" suggests that an individual's genetic success can be measured not only by its own reproduction, but also its contribution to the reproduction of its genetic relatives.

According to Hamilton's rule, for an altruistic behavior to evolve, the product of the behavior's benefit to the recipient (b) and the degree of genetic relatedness between the recipient and the donor (r) must be greater than the cost to the donor (c): $rb > c$.

Kin selection is an important theory in explaining the altruistic behavior observed not only in humans but also in many animal species. For example, in social insects (ants, bees...) self-sacrificing behavior can be understood within the framework of kin selection theory.

In humans, kin recognition and altruistic behavior towards relatives has been extensively documented in the evolutionary psychology literature. For example, Daly and Wilson's (1988) research has shown that stepparents invest less in children than biological parents and that cases of domestic violence are more common in stepfamilies.

In recent years, the theory of group selection has been reevaluated and the "multilevel selection theory" pioneered by evolutionary biologist David Sloan Wilson and philosopher Elliott Sober (1994) has been developed. This theory suggests that in-group cooperation and out-group competition play an important role in the evolution of moral norms.

Group selection theory, especially in the form of cultural group selection, offers an important explanation for understanding the evolution of group norms and group boundaries in humans. Richerson and Boyd (2005) suggested that cultural group selection can explain the spread of cooperative norms through competition between groups.

Edward O. Wilson and David Sloan Wilson (2007) developed the "multilevel selection theory", which argues that natural selection operates at both the individual and group levels. According to this theory, when the survival and reproductive success of the group depends on the level of cooperation of group members, behaviors that show altruism in favor of the group can evolve.

2.4. Neurobiological Foundations of Moral Emotions

In recent years, research in neuroscience has shown that moral feelings and decisions provides a more comprehensive understanding of their neurobiological underpinnings. fMRI studies have mapped brain regions that show activation during moral judgments.

The work of Joshua Greene and colleagues (2001) has shown that moral dilemmas different brain regions involved in the evaluation of impersonal moral dilemmas such as "trolleybus". In impersonal moral dilemmas such as "trolleybus", the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) cognitive control regions are more active, whereas emotional processing regions such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and amygdala are more active for personal moral dilemmas such as the "pedestrian bridge".

Patricia Churchland (2011), in her book "Braintrust, in which she examines the neurobiological basis of morality, argues that moral behavior is an extension of mammalian care behavior.

has continued. According to Churchland, neuropeptides, such as oxytocin and vasopressin, are involved in social plays a critical role in regulating attachment, empathy and caring behaviors.

Antonio Damasio's (1994) "somatic marker hypothesis" argues that our moral decisions are not only based on rational calculations, but also on emotional and bodily It suggests that they are also affected by reactions. Patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex show significant impairments in social and moral judgment documented, which emphasizes the importance of emotions in moral decisions.

3. Moral Diversity and Evolutionary Constants

3.1. Cross-Cultural Moral Differences

Anthropological research has documented that moral values and norms vary significantly in cultures around the world. In some societies, individual autonomy is glorified, while in others community values and compliance with legitimate authority are prioritized.

The "three theories of ethics" developed by Richard Shweder and colleagues (1997) provide an important explanation for understanding moral systems in different cultures:

- 1- Ethics of Autonomy: Emphasizes the rights, freedoms and autonomy of the individual. It is more prominent in Western liberal societies. It is built on the principles of individual choice, personal freedom and nonmaleficence. This ethic parallels Kant's deontological ethics and liberal political theories.
- 2- Community Ethics: Emphasizes social roles, mutual obligations and mass cohesion. It is more prominent in China, India and other collectivist societies. This ethic is based on the values of loyalty, duty, respect and harmony. Confucian ethics is a classic example of this ethic.
- 3- Holiness Ethics: Emphasizes physical and spiritual purity, holiness and preservation of the natural order. It is more prominent in religious societies. It is based on values such as cleanliness, purity, moderation and protection of religious taboos. The Hindu caste system and halal food rules are examples of this ethic.

The work of Joseph Henrich, Steven Heine, and Ara Norenzayan (2010) shows that the vast majority of psychological research is "WEIRD" (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic - Western, Educated, Industrialized, Wealthy, Democratic) societies and that the generalizability of these results may be limited. These researchers have shown that there are important cultural differences in psychological processes, including moral judgments.

Fons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden Turner's (1997) cross-cultural values research has shown differences in moral decision-making processes in different cultures. For example, some cultures adopt universalistic approaches (rule-based), while others adopt particularistic approaches (relationship-based).

3.2. Moral Relativism and Universality

Evolutionary psychology is a middle ground in the debate between moral relativism and moral universality.

presents. From the perspective of evolutionary psychology, our moral judgments are based on universal

While there are psychological mechanisms, how these mechanisms are expressed in a cultural context may vary (Boyd & Richerson, 2005).

Marc Hauser (2006), in his book "Moral Minds", that humans are born with a universal "moral grammar" and that this produces different "moral languages" in different cultures. Hauser based this view on Noam Chomsky's theory of language acquisition. According to this view, just as our language ability is based on universal linguistic rules, our moral thinking is based on universal psychological mechanisms, but expressed in different ways in cultural contexts.

John Mikhail (2007) similarly argues that human beings have a universal "moral grammar". and that this grammar, though expressed in different ways in different cultures, contains common structures underlying basic moral principles. In his view

According to him, moral judgments are based on a theory of action based on the evaluation of actions in terms of causality, intentionality and consequences.

In his study of the development of moral judgments in infants, Paul Bloom (2013) showed that even very young infants can distinguish between helpful and harmful behaviors and prefer characters who exhibit helpful behaviors. These findings support the idea that some basic moral intuitions are innate.

Alan Fiske (1992) argued that social relations in all cultures are based on four basic models: "Social Sharing" (sharing between close relatives), "Authority Ranking" (hierarchical relationships), "Equity Matching" (reciprocal and equal relationships) and "Market Pricing" (cost-benefit analysis). According to Fiske, different cultures apply these four basic models of social relations in different ways and in different contexts, but all cultures use these four models.

3.3. Moral Intuitions in the Modern World

Evolutionary psychologists recognize that the complexity of modern societies is quite different from the small hunter-gatherer groups in which our ancestors lived. This difference

our evolutionarily developed moral intuitions can sometimes produce incompatible results in modern contexts (Pinker, 2011).

Steven Pinker (2011), in his book "The Better Angels of Our Nature", argues that modern societies have evolved evolutionarily advanced destructive strategies to reduce violence and conflict.

institutions and norms that control our impulses. According to Pinker, psychological mechanisms such as empathy, self-control, moral sentiments and reason have contributed to the decline of violence in modern societies.

Peter Singer (1981), in his book "The Expanding Circle", argues that our moral circle and that moral concerns, which initially covered only relatives and the immediate group, have expanded over time to encompass all human beings and even other species. that our capacity for reasoning allows us to transcend our natural limits of empathy and expand our moral circle. According to Singer, our capacity to reason allows us to transcend our natural limits of empathy and expand our moral circle.

Joshua Greene (2013), in his book "Moral Tribes", divides moral problems into two categories: "me vs. us" problems (conflicts between individual interests and group interests) and "us vs. them" problems (conflicts between the moral values of different groups). According to Greene, while our evolutionarily developed moral intuitions may be effective in solving "me vs. us" problems, they may be inadequate in solving "us vs. them" problems, and a more conscious, utilitarian moral approach may be required for these problems.

In the modern world, here are examples of how our moral intuitions sometimes produce incompatible results:

- 1- In-group/out-group distinction: Evolutionarily, skepticism towards outsiders and a tendency to favor one's own group was an adaptive trait for our ancestors who lived in small groups. But in today's globalized and multicultural world, this tendency can lead to conflicts such as prejudice and discrimination.
- 2- Threat perception: In the environments in which our ancestors lived, certain threats, such as snakes and spiders, were indeed dangerous, and fear of them was adaptive.
Today, we may develop disproportionate fears about statistically less likely threats such as airplane crashes or terrorism, while we worry less about slower and intangible but more serious threats such as climate change (Slovic, 1987). This "risk perception dissonance" is one of the most important factors can create difficulties.
- 3- Food preferences: Our ancestors had a weakness for caloric foods (sugar, fat) because food was hard to come by and these foods were a strong preference when available. Today, however, the increase in sugar and fatty, high-calorie foods may contribute to the obesity epidemic.
- 4- Status seeking Evolutionarily, status seeking was adaptive as it provided access to resources and potential mates. Today, this drive can contribute to environmentally unsustainable consumption patterns and economic inequality.

4. Evolutionary Psychology and Moral Philosophy

4.1. The Naturalistic Fallacy and Moral Implications

The "naturalistic fallacy" or "is-ought problem" pointed out by David Hume and G.E. Moore emphasizes that it is a logical fallacy to move from what is to what ought to be. This philosophical principle is an important element in assessing the moral implications of evolutionary psychology.

In trying to explain the evolutionary origins of moral feelings and intuitions, evolutionary psychologists generally avoid making moral normative inferences. Providing an evolutionary explanation of moral feelings and behaviors does not imply that these feelings and behaviors are morally correct. For example, while in-group favoritism may be evolutionarily understandable, it does not mean that such behavior is morally defensible (Kitcher, 2011).

Jesse Prinz (2007), while acknowledging the emotional foundations of morality, argued for moral relativism and that evolutionary explanations tell us little about the normative status of moral norms. According to Prinz, moral sentiments may have evolutionary origins, but they are culturally shaped and norms can vary considerably across cultures.

On the other hand, some thinkers, such as Sam Harris (2010), argue that an understanding of morality can be developed based on scientific findings. According to Harris, morality is fundamentally a concept that conscious beings welfare, and science is about what actions and policies maximize welfare.

can help in determining what they infer. This view suggests that the naturalistic fallacy can be overcome and moral norms can be derived from scientific findings.

4.2. Evolutionary Ethics and Normative Theories

The fact that evolutionary processes explain the origin of moral norms can have important implications for the evaluation of different normative ethical theories. The three main normative ethical theories (utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics) can be analyzed from an evolutionary perspective.

Utilitarianism: The work of Joshua Greene (2013) suggests that utilitarian moral judgments are based on more controlled, conscious cognitive processes. Greene argues that our evolutionarily developed moral intuitions have evolved to support cooperation in small groups.

evolved, but may be inadequate to deal with modern global challenges. Therefore, Greene argues that utilitarian ethics can provide a "meta-ethics" that is more effective in reconciling the interests of different groups.

Peter Singer (1981), with his concept of the "widening circle", argued that our moral concerns first evolutionarily encompassed our close relatives, but through our capacity to reason, this circle has widened over time and could potentially encompass all conscious beings. Singer argues that by overcoming the constraints of our evolutionary origins, we can develop a more universal understanding of morality.

Deontology: Kantian deontological ethics is based on universalizable moral rules and respect for human dignity. Evolutionary psychologists have suggested that the principle of reciprocity may underlie deontological principles such as the "golden rule". The work of Michael Tomasello (2016) has shown that humans have special adaptations that have evolved for cooperation and that these adaptations can form the basis of normative thinking and moral rules.

Virtue Ethics: Virtue ethics focuses on character and virtues. From an evolutionary perspective, virtues can be seen as character traits that promote social cooperation and group cohesion. Christopher Boehm (2012) examines the evolution of moral virtues.

In his work, he suggested that virtues such as humility, generosity and honesty may have evolved to support "reverse-hierarchy" structures in hunter-gatherer societies. In these structures, group members form coalitions to limit the use of power by dominant individuals.

Anthropologist Sarah Blaffer Hrdy (2009) has emphasized the critical role that mothering and caring behaviors have played in human evolution, arguing that virtues such as empathy and compassion are essential for childcare and suggested that it may have evolved in the context of cooperative reproduction

4.3. The Limits and Possibilities of Moral Naturalism

Moral naturalism is the philosophical view that moral facts and values can be understood in terms of natural facts and properties. Evolutionary psychology argues that morality

naturalization efforts, but this approach has its limits.

Phillip Kitcher (2011), in his book "The Ethical Project", argues that morality can be seen as a "technology" that has evolved to deal with social conflicts. According to Kitcher, morality functions as a social technology that enables people to live together in mutually acceptable ways. This view emphasizes both the evolutionary origins and cultural evolution of morality.

Some philosophers, such as Christine Korsgaard (2006), argue that evolutionary explanations cannot fully grasp the normative dimension of morality. According to Korsgaard, morality can only be understood as a normative enterprise and requires a normative stance. In this view, morality should be understood as a "second nature" that goes beyond our biological origins.

Daniel Dennett (1995) argues that morality can be understood from an evolutionary perspective, but that this understanding does not undermine moral reality. According to Dennett, moral

Understanding the evolutionary origins of our emotions and intuitions does not remove the validity of these emotions and intuitions, but rather allows us to better understand and evaluate them.

5. Modern Research Findings and Debates

5.1. Experimental Moral Psychology

In recent years, work in experimental moral psychology has continued to elucidate the cognitive and emotional mechanisms of moral judgments and decisions.

Fiery Cushman et al. (2006) argue that people's moral judgments are influenced by three different factors: the actions themselves (instrumental quality) and the intention behind the action. This study shows that our moral intuitions can be multidimensional and sometimes contradictory.

(2010) have shown that our ability to understand the mental states of others (theory of mind) plays an important role in our moral judgments. In particular, a brain region called the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) has been found to play a critical role in intention-based moral judgments.

Yoel Inbar and colleagues (2009) have shown that feelings of disgust can affect moral judgments and that individuals with high sensitivity to disgust tend to make more conservative judgments, especially on moral issues related to purity/holiness.

5.2. Intercultural and Developmental Studies

Joseph Henrich et al. (2010), in their economic research with individuals from different societies

Through testing, we have found that norms of fairness and cooperation are significantly different across cultures.

They have documented that they vary. For example, the definition of a fair share and the severity of penalties for cheating vary across cultures.

Infant research by Paul Bloom and colleagues has shown that even 6-month-old infants can distinguish between helpful and harmful behaviors and prefer helpful behaviors (Bloom, 2013). These findings support the idea that some basic moral intuitions are innate or develop very early in life.

Kiley Hamlin et al. (2011) showed that infants prefer the principle of "fair distribution" and prefer characters who distribute resources equally to characters who distribute resources unequally.

Developmental studies show that children's moral development involves both universal cognitive maturation processes and culture-specific socialization processes. Elliot Turiel (1983) has shown that children are able to distinguish between moral rules (regarding harm and justice) and social-conventional rules (regarding social order) from an early age.

5.3. Evolutionary Psychonomic Evidence

Evolutionary psychonomic (evolutionary behavioral economics) research examines the evolutionary origins of our economic decisions and preferences.

Behavioral economists such as Herbert Gintis (2000) have suggested that the "strong reciprocity" behavior observed in economic games such as the ultimatum game and the public goods game may have evolved through group selection or gene-culture coevolutionary processes. Strong reciprocity is characterized by individuals incurring a personal cost.

refers to the tendency to reward those who cooperate and punish those who do not.

Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter's (2002) work on "altruistic punishment" shows that people will punish norm violators even if it does not directly benefit them.

willingness to punish. Such behavior can play an important role in maintaining cooperation within social groups.

Economist Robert Frank (1988) has argued that emotions can function as signals of commitment to behaviors that appear "irrational" but are strategically advantageous. For example, the emotion of anger, even if it is costly in the short run, is in the long run more can ensure that we are treated fairly because it provides a reliable signal that we can take revenge when others are not treated fairly.

6. Modernity, Technology and Moral Challenges

6.1. Evolutionary Maladaptations in Modern Society

Modern technological society is very different from the environment in which our ancestors lived, and our evolutionarily evolved psychological mechanisms can produce incompatible outcomes in today's world. These "evolutionary mismatches" provide an important framework for understanding many of our modern moral problems.

Daniel Kahneman (2011), in his book "Thinking, Fast and Slow", argues that human thinking processes consist of two systems: "System 1", which is fast, automatic and intuitive, and "System 2", which is slow, conscious and analytical. Our evolutionarily evolved intuitive responses (System 1) may be biased or inadequate to deal with the complex problems of the modern world.

In his book "Behave", Robert Sapolsky (2017) examines the biological basis of behaviors such as aggression, in-group/out-group distinction and hierarchy and analyzes how these behaviors function in modern societies. Sapolsky emphasizes that our biological tendencies are not our destiny and that we can channel these tendencies through culture and education.

Examples of evolutionary incompatibilities in the modern world include:

- 1- Non-face-to-face interactions: Humans for face-to-face interactions but nowadays most of our communication takes place in digital environments. This can negatively impact our ability to empathize and make social connections.
- 2- Distant threats: Human psychology is hardwired to react to immediate and tangible threats. evolved. Defense against wild animals is one example. Therefore, we may find it difficult to take action against abstract and long-term threats such as climate change or university exams (Weber, 2006).
- 3- Global interdependence: Our social psychology, evolutionarily adapted for small groups, distinguishing between "us" and "them", can make transnational cooperation difficult in an era of global interdependence.

6.2. Moral Reflections for Future Generations

Evolutionary psychology suggests that our moral considerations are often short-term and group-specific. However, many of our modern problems (climate change, nuclear threat, artificial intelligence risks), long-term thinking and global cooperation.

In his book "Reasons and Persons", Derek Parfit (1984) explored the philosophical challenges of our moral responsibilities towards future generations. Parfit argues that identity and

He used arguments about the nature of continuity to suggest new ways of thinking about our moral obligations to people in the distant future.

In his book "Death and the Afterlife", Samuel Scheffler (2013) developed the concept of "collective afterlife" and examined how the value we place on the continued future of humanity shapes our present decisions and values. According to Scheffler, the belief in the future existence of humanity shapes our current values and projects. These are important for the meaningfulness of our values and projects.

Longtermism is a philosophy that considers the well-being of future generations place it at the center of our thinking. William MacAskill (2022), in his book "What We Owe The Future", defended this perspective and argued that long-term thinking is the key to expanding our moral horizons and considering the welfare of more people. We need to keep it in place.

7. Conclusion and Future Research Directions

Evolutionary psychology has provided important insights into the origins and functioning of human morality. Understanding the evolutionary origins of our moral emotions and intuitions allows us to gain a more holistic account of our moral nature and to better grasp both the strengths and limitations of our moral thinking.

Evolutionary psychology offers a middle ground in the debate between moral relativism and moral universality, recognizing both the existence of universal moral intuitions that are the product of our common evolutionary heritage and that these intuitions can be expressed in different ways across cultural contexts.

In my future research, I intend to examine the neurobiological basis of moral judgments in more detail and to explore cross-cultural moral differences and similarities in more detail. I can focus on creating a comprehensive map and understanding how our evolutionarily developed moral intuitions can be better guided in dealing with modern global challenges.

It also explores the moral implications of new technologies such as artificial intelligence and biotechnology.

evolutionary perspectives can provide important insights. To understand how humans respond to technological innovations and the moral challenges they bring, it is important to consider the functioning of our evolutionarily developed psychological mechanisms.

In conclusion, evolutionary psychology offers a comprehensive framework for the evolution of morality and the origins of moral dispositions in human nature. This approach is not only of theoretical interest, but can also make concrete contributions to our efforts to build a more just, sensitive and responsible society by understanding the biological and evolutionary basis of our moral judgments. Understanding the evolutionary background of human behavior

strong and powerful organizations that can provide guidance on a wide range of issues, from relationships to global ethical issues.
a value proposition.

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